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Abstract
This paper presents an application of functional resonance analysis method for an exploratory study of accidents at workplace
where some type of improvisation took place. Improvisation, along with creativity, can be seen as a basis for advancements in 
virtually all knowledge areas. The necessity to overcome a barrier, a difficulty, a discomfort,  or any  constraint is a driving force 
for mankind to improvise - it is a natural act, a product of intelligence under unplanned circumstances and a way to cope with 
resource constraints. Despite the improvements improvisation can bring to the society, it can also result in unwanted outputs,
mainly when it is performed at the workplace, in the presence of hazardous situations and unknown situations. The main problem 
with improvisation occur when its consequences are ignored and cannot be predictable, once it can lead to devastating events. So, 
why firms improvise? The basic response is to have the work done in the face of a demand for lacking resources. This research is 
essentially a exploratory study and was conducted to provide a better understanding of accidents resulting from improvisation at 
work. Three accident reports were selected from open databases in Brazil and are presented to provide an overview of the role of 
improvisation at work on accident causation. In order to study the accidents resulting from improvisation, this study applied the 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM). All cases had in common the lack of hazards recognition, lack of planning, 
lack of  supervision, and the pressure for productivity firms imposed to workers.
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1. Introduction
Improvisation, along with creativity, can be seen as a basis for advancements in virtually all knowledge areas. 
The necessity to overcome a barrier, a difficulty, a discomfort,  or any  constraint is a driving force for mankind to 
improvise - it is a natural act, a product of intelligence under unplanned circumstances. Improvisation can also be 
seen as a product of creativity - a result from the desire of doing something in a different manner, usually seen as a 
better one.
Despite the improvements improvisation can bring to the society, it can also result in accidents in the presence of 
hazardous and unknown situations, generating unwanted system outputs at the workplace. The kind of improvisation 
of  interest in this study is that associated with bricolage - "a natural form of disclosing new uses and applications of 
technology and things at hand" [1] - to deal with constraints at the workplace on the operational level.
To explore accidents resulting from improvisation, researchers have to be aware of the particular situation in 
which improvisation occurs. As well as improvisation could be a response for emergencies situations, it could also 
be a form to surpass some barrier imposed by the lack of tools, materials, or personal at the moment the worker 
needs them. This study focus on the latter situation and was conducted through the analysis of three accidents were 
some type of improvisation at operational level took place in three Brazilian enterprises with 53, 100 and 326 
employees each [2].
Operational works are done to achieve business goals. Operations constitute an organization's on-going, repetitive 
activities, such as accounting or production, i.e., sequence activities that transform inputs into outputs [3]. The way 
operational systems function as an everyday activity is far from the formal procedures and written manuals stored on 
the organization's shelves. The use of  bricolage to surpass a barrier seems to be specially used at operational level in 
small enterprises, since they have to cope with severe business constraints in order to survive, but is not limited to 
them. The "inability to appropriately compensate for occurring problems" [4] associated to a low priority given to 
occupational health and safety issues by the owners/managers  [5] and pressure over employees to complete the 
assigned tasks set the stage to improvisation at work that leads to accidents. 
The objective of this research is to better understand key aspects of improvisation at work on operational level 
that leads to accident causation, and thus to understand why the outcome of an action (improvisation) was 
unacceptable (adverse) rather than acceptable (successful). The main reason to better understand the paths of 
improvisation at work is the under-estimated managers and owners give to this kind of practice in Brazil allowing 
accidents to happen. The kind of improvisation related in this article is that associated with "the Brazilian way to 
deal with a problem in an imaginative way" (Rodrigues et al) and as an innovative problem-solving strategy in 
which the individual uses social influence combined with craftiness tricks to achieve goals, despite the fact that it 
may breaks formal rules. 
The central argument in this paper is that understanding the role of improvisation on accidents may contribute to 
improve worker awareness about hazardous situations, and to conscious managers and workers about the perils of 
ignoring the consequences from improvisation on tasks under their responsibilities.
2. Method
The method used to explore the cases in this research was the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM), 
developed by Hollnagel [6]. This method was created to enhance researchers capabilities on the investigation of 
accidents and risk analysis and is based on the Resilience Engineering principles, mainly in that which recognize 
failures and success as closely related phenomena and not incompatible opposites. In order to have the task 
completed in a system, many subtasks should be performed, and what determine the success or failure of the task is 
the way the subtasks are performed and combined to produce it. Thus, failures and success are possible results of the 
aggregation of work performance.
For Hollnagel [7], "an unsafe state may arise because adjustments to perform the tasks of a system are 
insufficient or inappropriate rather than because something fails" and "things go wrong because the variability of 
everyday performance aggregates in an unexpected manner". This is captured by the principle functional resonance 
that is the basis for the FRAM." [8]
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Some common conditions can be the source for performance variations, namely, lack of time, lack of knowledge, 
lack of competence and lack of resources [9]
Performance variability means that instead of following the assigned procedures to perform the task, workers 
make adjustments in the manner they do the task in order to accomplish it through deviations from existing 
procedures and knowledge [10]. Variations on work performance can be combined to produce an undesirable output 
such as an accident. As improvisations can be seen as a type of performance variability, FRAM was chosen to 
investigate the accidents.
The method is comprised of four steps:
1. Identify the functions or operational units of the system being analyzed;
2. Characterize each function by six basic parameters: Input (I), Output (O), Time (T), Control (C), Precondition
(P), and Resource (R), represented in Figure 1; and characterize the performance variability of each function in
terms of timing and precision. The Timing aspect of the output variability should be classified as "too early", "on 
time", "too late" or "not at all"; and the Precision should be classified as "precise", "acceptable" and "imprecise", 
considering the output of the function  as it was done.
Nomenclature
I that which the function processes or transforms or that which starts the function
O the result of the function, can be an entity or a state change
R resource(s) required for the processing performed by the function
T time required for the processing performed by the operational unit
C constraints and controls the operational unit (exceptions, procedures, methods, etc.)
P conditions that must be satisfied before a function can be carried out
3. Look at specific instantiations of the model and proceed the aggregation of variability in order to find out 
disturbances in the system performance that may had lead to unwanted results.
4. Propose solutions for dampen performance variability
The final step aims to find ways to  cope with the possible outcomes of uncontrolled performance variability 
found by the  preceding steps. The solutions could be removing the threat, adding some barrier or defense, making 
easy useful practices; and protecting the system.
3. Accident episodes descriptions
A challenge to explore the effects of improvisation at work associated with an accident episode was to find real, 
accurate cases descriptions in Brazil. The three cases were chosen from 35 accident reports analyzed by the 
Regional Labour and Employment Superintendence of Rio Grande do Sul [2]. The criteria to choose them was the 
presence of, at least, one episode of improvisation to perform the assigned task. In the first case, a experienced 
worker felt from an improvised ladder; the second case describes an electrical discharge suffered from a worker 
Fig. 1. Hexagram representing an operational unit of FRAM.
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during the operation of a concrete mixer with improvised repair on the twine; and, finally, the third case describes an 
accident where worker was burned due to the use of an improvised solvent to clean a table in the presence of a 
flame. All the cases resulted in fatal injuries.
The cases were explored following the principles of the FRAM. First, the main functions required for everyday 
work in each case were identified and described. Then, the instantiation of the FRAM model were designed for the 
specific situation of each case. Finally, the "Variability of Output" of each function were identified and described 
where performance varied and the disturbances were analysed.
3.1. Case 1: Worker falls from unsecure stair
The accident took place in an aircraft maintenance company with more than 100 employees. worker A was
designated to help workers B and C to install a target system on both airplane wings. He was an experienced and 
skilled aircraft maintenance technician.
After failing to install the target system onto the left plane, workers A, B and C went to the other wing in order to 
install the other target system. To reach the upper side of the wing, workers must pick up and attach a ladder module 
to the dock station and climb it. They realized the absence of the ladder module and decided to pick up an 
improvised ladder. The improvised ladder had insufficient height to reach the dock station and none guardrail. To 
fix the problem, Worker B pick up a wood step and placed it on the top of the improvised ladder with the smallest 
base of the step resting on the floor. Worker A climbed the improvised set and then noted that the blueprint was 
missing. He could not do the work without the documentation. worker A down the stairs in order to take the 
blueprint and returned to the work station. With the blueprint in hands, Worker A climbed again the improvised set 
and positioned his foot onto the wood step. Due to the leg impulse, the improvised step loose its stability and 
moved. Worker A did not reach the dock station and felt. After being rescued, he died at the hospital.
The main functions of the model and the description of the output variability are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Output variability of the Case 1.
Function Variability of output 
Send an order to install target system Precise
Pick up the matching dock station stair module Imprecise, wrong object: the worker picked a non specific ladder and a wooden step 
to reach the dock station instead of the right ladder
Position the ladder module on the dock station Imprecise. The improvised wood stair was placed resting on the smallest base, on an 
instable position, increasing the stair instability.
Pick up the blueprint Omission. Worker forgot to pick up the blueprint
Access the dock station Imprecise, the worker lost stability while climbing the improvised wood stair
Install "target" system onto right plane wing Not done
An instantiation of the FRAM model is shown in Figure 2. The sine wave symbol represents a performance 
variation of the output of an specific function. It means that the outcome of this function was another than the 
expected.
The access to the dock station has been compromised due to the output variance of both upstream functions 
<position the ladder module on the dock station> and <provide the blueprint>. The first, because the worker could 
not position the ladder correctly since it was not the matching equipment to fit the dock station; and the latter, 
because since the blueprint was not in hand, worker A had to use the improvised ladder once more to accomplish his 
task.  However, the performance variation of the function <pick up the matching dock station ladder module>
played a fundamental role on the accident causation. The improvised solution to overcome the restraint faced by the 
workers gave rise to the worker fall, although it has happened at the second time he climbed the improvised stairs.
A more detailed analysis of the function <Pick up the…ladder> indicates that lack of coordination and lack of 
supervision in association with high pressure to reduce the working hours needed to convert the aircraft promoted a 
fertile environment to improvisation. The hurry to finish the job, the unavailabity of the adequate ladder, and the 
permissive organizational environment compelled the worker to find an improvised solution by himself in order to 
complete the assigned task. 
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Fig. 2. Instantiation of the FRAM model for Case 1 - 'Worker fall from unsecure stair.'
3.2. Case 2: Worker takes an electrical discharge while operating a concrete mixer
The accident took place in a building under construction where Worker A was a hodman. The company had 53 
employees. On the day of the accident, worker A was operating a concrete mixer when he received an electrical 
discharge. His job used to be feeding the machine with sand, cement, brita and water, removing the concrete from 
the machine and bringing it to the other workers. According to Mr. B, the concrete mixer was laying over a wet 
ground. The Worker A wore ordinary shoes, wetting his feet while operating the machine. When worker A turned 
the side mixer wheel, he took an electrical discharge. The concrete mixer was in a bad maintenance situation and 
had many inadequate twine patches, with switches in bad state. The power supply was taken directly from the light 
pole with improvised hooks hanging from the electric wires. Trying to help, Worker C turned the machine off 
leading the Worker A to fall on the ground in front of the concrete mixer opening. The fresh concrete fell over 
worker A mouth and nose. After 30 minutes the worker was rescued. He died at the hospital from electrocution and 
mechanical blockage of the respiratory tract.  
The main functions of the model and the description of the output variability are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Output Variability of the Case 2.
Function Variability of output (time/precision)
Supply a concrete mixer ready to use on the 
building construction place
Imprecise. Concrete mixer with many improvised twine patches, with switches in bad 
state
Make power supply available Imprecise. The power supply was taken directly from the light pole with improvised 
hooks hanging from the electric wires. The order to use an improvised power supply 
was made by the responsible builder in order to not paying for the power supply.
Supply Individual Personal Equipment to the 
concrete mixer operator
Imprecise. Operator wore ordinary shoes
Position the mixer in a suitable place to its 
operation 
Imprecise. The concrete mixer was placed over an wet ground
Turn on the concrete mixer Imprecise. Operator took an electrical discharge
The case 'worker takes an electrical discharge' is shown as a FRAM model in Figure 3.
This case showed many improvised situations: the concrete mixer twines with inadequate patches, the use of 
improvised hooks to supply power to the mixer, and the use of ordinary, improvised shoes to operate the mixer. 
These improvisations associated with the positioning of the concrete mixer over a wet ground settled the stage for 
the accident to happen. The function <Turn on the concrete mixer> aggregated the variability of all upstream 
R
O
P
CT
I
Pick up the 
matching 
dock station 
ladder 
R
O
P
CT
I
Position the 
ladder on 
the dock 
station
R
O
P
CT
I
Access 
the dock 
station
R
O
P
CT
I
Install 
"target" 
system 
R
O
P
CT
I
Pick up 
the 
blueprint
ACCIDENT
R
O
P
CT
I
Make 
ladder 
available
R
O
P
CT
I
Pressure to 
install target 
system 
faster
1809 Ana Gabriella Amorim and Claudio M.N.A. Pereira /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  1804 – 1811 
Fig. 3. Instantiation of the FRAM model for Case 2 - 'Worker takes an electrical discharge.’
functions causing the collapse of the system.  Clearly, all functions lack a Control function to supervise or regulate 
them with instructions and procedures. It is also clear the builder intention to save money no matter the employees 
exposition to unsafe situations. 
3.3. Case 3: Worker suffers burns trying to clean her working table
The accident took place on a shoe atelier at the end of an working day at a shoe fabric with 326 employees. 
Worker A grabbed a inflammable solvent to clean her working table. At the other side of the table was a lamp used 
to take the leather wrinkles, with the flame burning. Worker A opened the solvent bottle and immediately the inner 
content ignited. She tried to threw the bottle through the window, but it hit the wall and felt over a pile of shoe 
components that started to burn. Worker A lost her balance and felt over the burning pile. The victim had been taken 
to the hospital and died two months later in consequence of burns.
Table 3. Output Variability for the Case 3.
Function Variability of output (time/precision)
Clean the working table Imprecise, not done
Make detergent available for cleaning the table Imprecise. Wrong, hazardous product used to clean the table.
Provide safe heat source to take the leather wrinkles Imprecise. Wrong object. The flame was a hazardous source in the presence of 
an inflammable material such as the solvent used in the shoe manufacturing.
The case 'worker suffers burns trying to clean her working table' is shown as a FRAM model in Figure 4.
The use of a solvent as a cleaning product was a solution to finish the task of cleaning the table faster and easier. 
The company consent and the lack of control over the process created a fertile soil to accidents happen.  As 
described in Table 3, the use of a lamp was a hazardous source in the presence of inflammable materials such as the 
solvent used in the shoe manufacturing. Both performance variations combined in an expected way generating the 
accident.
Fig. 4. Instantiation of the FRAM model for 'Worker suffers burns trying to clean her working table."
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4. Discussion
The aim of this article was to better understand key issues of improvisation at work that results in accident. The 
use of the FRAM method provided a frame to the study by explaining what should have been done at a normal day 
of work and what was the variation in the work performance that combined to hatch in an accident. The method 
exposed the consequences of the improvisations (as performance variations) and highlighted the power of functional 
resonance in the accident causation.   
The cases enlightened some motivations workers and managers appeal to use as an improvised solution at work 
to overcome a barrier. They are as follow:
x the owner/manager pressure to employee finish his/her task to increase productivity (case 1); 
x the owner/manager pressure to save money (case 2); 
x doing the job, no matter how, for fearing lose the job (cases 1 and 2), 
x the hurry to finish the assigned task (case 3)
x ignoring the threats posed by their improvised solutions (cases 1, 2 and 3)
x the lack of process control by the owner/manager (cases 1, 2 and 3)
x the lack of resources (cases 1, 2 and 3)
Although companies had been neglecting safety issues, the workers encountered a way to complete their tasks 
using the tools and materials available, letting implicit their unfair position in the face of the company power over 
their jobs. The cases showed submission of workers to the negligence of companies concerning occupational health 
and safety issues. This submission can be deduced from the fact that none of the workers questioned the hazardous 
situation they were subjected. Actually, they were compelled to find a way to complete their jobs, no matter how, 
making use of improvised solutions as could be seen in the use of a ordinary ladder and a wood step to reach the 
dock station, in case 1; the use of twine patches, in case 2; and the use of a solvent as a cleaner product in the 
presence of a flame, in case 3. 
According to the FRAM method, all the given solutions to cope with the restraints, were variations of the work 
performance, i.e. they were alternative ways to do the assigned task.  Such performance variations combined in an 
unexpected way and resulted in adverse situations.  The FRAM analyses exposed the recurrent weak or lack of 
control and supervise over the working process in all three cases. Workers had great autonomy to do the necessary 
arrangements to do their jobs with no protective actions and ignoring the perils they were exposed. It reflects the
lack of company responsibility about occupational  health and safety issues. Doing the job no matter how, using 
improvised solutions, in a company which does not take OHS seriously, showed to be a dangerous way to deal with 
restraints at operational work.
May not be the case to freeze the flexibility and improvisation capacity inherent  to Brazilian culture, but to 
introduce and reinforce a resilient culture and capabilities. It seems clear that "the ability to manage disturbances 
and to adjust to new or unforeseen situations by improvisation is of utmost importance for successful crisis 
management." [11], but not at any cost, and without preparing the ground to allow a safe operational work. Briefly 
stating, a successful improvisation could only took place in a environment with a mature safety culture, embraced by 
a resilient culture. May be the case transmuting the improvisation act to an adaptation act, as resilience engineering 
states, meaning workers should be trained to anticipate the consequences of their acts, to pay attention of what is 
happening at the moment they are experiencing the unusual situation and to response accordingly to overcome it. 
A resilient organization should understand the ongoing events and  be able to know what will happen while 
improvising in the face of emergency situations. Being in control of process means: knowing what will happen and 
what has happened. Hollnagel's test of whether an organization is in control requires the controlling entity to be able 
to understand events, anticipate and plan for the future [12].
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5. Conclusion
This study has explored the role of improvisation at operational work that resulted in accidents. Three cases from 
companies in Brazil were studied. As a general pattern, exploring improvisation within the cases has showed some 
relevant findings: the lack of a safety culture allowed many risky situations in behalf of having the work done 
anyway. Time pressure, fear of losing their jobs, lack of control and lack of resources compelled workers to 
improvise without worrying about what would happen as consequence. As the result of using the FRAM method to 
explore the cases, it became clear that the improvisations, recognized as performance variation, combined with 
others performance variations generating a functional resonance effect that resulted in an accident.
References
[1] T.O.Grotan, F. Storseth, M.H. Ro, a.b. Skjerve, Resileience, Adaptation an Improvisation - Increasing Resilience by Organising for 
Successful Improvisation. 3rd Sympoium on Resileince Engineering Antibes, Juan-Les-Pins, October 28-30, 2008.
[2] Análises de acidentes do trabalho fatais no Rio Grande do Sul: a experiência da Seção de Segurança e Saúde do Trabalhador – SEGUR. –
Porto Alegre: Superintendência Regional do Trabalho e Emprego do Rio Grande do Sul. Seção de Segurança e Saúde do 
Trabalhador/SEGUR, 2008. 336 p. : il. ; 16x23cm.
[3] J.A.Chapman, The Work of Managers in New Organisational Contexts. The Journal of Management Development. 20 No.1 (2001) 55-68
[4] J. Thun, M. Drüke, D. Hoenig, Managing Uncertainty - An Empirical Analysis of Supply Chain Risk Management in Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises. International Journal of Production Research. 49 No.18 (2011) 5511-5525
[5] M. Seneviratne, W.O. Phoon, Exposure Assessment in SMEs: A Low-Cost Approach to Bring OHS Services to Small-Scale Enterprises.
Industrial Health. 44 (2006) 27-30
[6] Hollnagel, E. (2004). Barriers and accident prevention. Aldershot: Ashgate
[7] Hollnagel, E. Resilience – the challenge of the unstable, in E. Hollnagel, D.D. Woods & N. Leveson (Eds.), Resilience Engineering. Concepts 
and Precepts. Aldeshot: Ashgate. 2006, pp. 9-17
[8] Hollnagel, E. The Functional Resonance Analysis Method. 2015. 04/09/2015. www.functionalresonance.com
[9] E. Hollnagel, D.D. Woods, Joint Cognitive Systems: Foundations of Cognitive Systems Engineering. CRC, Florida, 2011.
[10] C. Chelariu, W. J. Johnston, L. Young, Learning to Improvise, Improvising to Learn - A Process of Responding to Complex Environments. 
Journal of Business Research 55 (2002) 141-147
[11] A. Rankin, N. Dahlbäck, J. Lundberg, A Case Study of Factor Influencing Role Improvisation. Cogn. Tech. Work. 15 (2013) 79-93
[12] L. Collins, F. Schmid, A. Tobias, Managing Incidents in a Complex System: A Railway Case Study. Cogn. Tech. Work. 16 (2014) 171-185
